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DP 2005-05: The Economic Costs and the Political Allure of Conscription
By   Panu Poutvaara and Andreas Wagener
State :  Published, the Economics of Peace and Security Journal 2 (1), 6 - 15, 2007
Abstract

We summarize the economic rationale against military draft and related forms of compulsory services. Such schemes forego the benefits of specialization and ignore comparative advantages. Introducing or extending compulsory labor services would exacerbate, rather than alleviate, the challenges from population aging and escalate intergenerational imbalances. We suggest that the political allure of conscription arises from the possibility to concentrate the tax burden on a minority of voters in a way that is generally held to be unacceptable with normal taxation. 

 

JEL codes: D6, H56, H57

 

Length: 14 pages

 

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Correspondence

Panu Poutvaara

Centre for Economic and Business Research (CEBR)
Copenhagen Business School

Porcelaenshaven, Bldg 65

DK-2000 Frederiksberg
>T: +45 3815 3494
>F: +45 3815 3499
>E: panu.poutvaara@cebr.dk

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Correspondence
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