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|  | |  | | DP 2005-05: The Economic Costs and the Political Allure of Conscription |
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Panu Poutvaara and Andreas Wagener | | State
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Published, the Economics of Peace and Security Journal 2 (1), 6 - 15, 2007 |  | | Abstract |  | |
We summarize the economic rationale against military draft and related forms of compulsory services. Such schemes forego the benefits of specialization and ignore comparative advantages. Introducing or extending compulsory labor services would exacerbate, rather than alleviate, the challenges from population aging and escalate intergenerational imbalances. We suggest that the political allure of conscription arises from the possibility to concentrate the tax burden on a minority of voters in a way that is generally held to be unacceptable with normal taxation.
JEL codes: D6, H56, H57
Length: 14 pages
View PDF-file |  |  |  |  | |  | | Correspondence |  | Panu Poutvaara
Centre for Economic and Business Research (CEBR) Copenhagen Business School
Porcelaenshaven, Bldg 65
DK-2000 Frederiksberg >T: +45 3815 3494 >F: +45 3815 3499 >E: panu.poutvaara@cebr.dk |  |  |  |  | |  |  |
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